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Commercial Law
By John M. Hewson, III*
Last year's Survey reported that the field of commercial law was expanding rapidly and that the courts were receptive to innovative solutions to
protect consumers from the rigors of the traditional commercial-law concepts. This year has been mixed. Some courts have pushed "consumerism"
to new lengths, while other have retraced their steps from the extremes of
the past few years and returned to more traditional commercial law concepts. This article discusses some of the more important developments in
the peripheral area of Truth-in-Lending as well as report the cases and
statutes for the 1975-76 year within the traditional realm of commercial
law.
I.

LEGISLATION

The Georgia legislature during its 1976 session enacted a number of
statutes which are of interest to commercial lawyers. Under the provisions
of one new act, purchasers at judicial sales need not tender cash and
instead may tender a cashier's or certified check drawn for the amount of
the purchase price and issued or certified by any financial institution
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation.' Georgia Code chapter 67-99 was
amended by adding new §67-9901.1, 2 which makes it unlawful for any
person who has given a bill of sale to secure a debt or some other security
instrument for any motor vehicle "to sell or otherwise dispose of said motor
vehicle, or cause the same to be removed from the limits of the state before
payment of the debt secured by the security instrument, if such sale or
removal is without the consent of or with the intent to defraud the holder
of the security instrument." The penalty for violating the law is imprisonment for not less than one year or more than three years.
The General Assembly 3 amended Code §57-202(a), part of the Secondary
Security Deed Act,' to clear up some inconsistencies. It also amended Code
§57-203 to provide for some new penalty provisions. The penalty of forfeiture of the entire principal amount of the loan plus interest and other
*
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charges is retained but is limited to those cases where the lender has
contracted for, charged, received, or collected more than the charge of
those expressly allowed by the Act for reasons other than bona fide error.
All other violations result in the forfeiture only of the interest charged or
taken or contracted to be reserved, charged or taken.
Code §57-116, which provided for 6% added interest on installment
loans, has been amended to provide for 7% added interest. The language
contained in the amendment is identical to the language in the original Act
except the interest rate. This amendment apparently will not change the
rate of interest that may be charged under Charges and Interest on Secondary Security Deeds provided in Code §57-201. The allowable interest rate
under that section is 6% added interest or its equivalent.
The new Motor Vehicle, Farm Machinery and Construction Equipment
Franchise Practice Act' is meant to comprehensively revise and codify
state laws regulating motor vehicle franchises, farm machinery franchises
and construction equipment franchises and to regulate the sales of these
types of goods. The Act provides for a Franchise Practices Commission and
sets out a licensing procedure for franchised dealers. A number of unauthorized acts are also set out, and provisions are made for the denial,
censure, suspension or revocation of a license in the event of violations.
II.
A.

SALES

Contracts and Agreements

In Simson v. Moon,7 a wrecker-truck dealer sold the same vehicle twice.
The dealer, Hollowell, first sold a wrecker truck to Moon for cash, delivered
to Moon an invoice and a signed manufacturer's certificate of origin, then
told Moon that the truck was in the possession of a company in Tennessee
that was mounting the wrecker equipment. Subsequently, Hollowell sold
the same truck to Simson, delivered to him a signed application for a tag
and title, and told Simson that the truck was in Chattanooga, where the
wrecker equipment was being installed. Simson, who didn't know about
the prior sale, went to Chattanooga and accepted delivery of the truck.
When Moon discovered that Simson had possession of the wrecker truck,
he applied for and obtained a Georgia certificate of title. Hollowell absconded with the proceeds from both sales, and Moon brought suit to.
recover the vehicle from Simson. The question was which of the two purchasers had title to the vehicle. The majority of the court held that the
issue was whether there was an "entrusting" of the truck under UCC § 2403(2) and (3), which state:
5. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1197.
6. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1440; GA. CODE ANN. ch. 84-66 (Supp. 1976).
7. 137 Ga. App. 82, 222 S.E.2d 873 (1975).
8. GA. CODE ANN. §§109A2-403(2) and -403(3) (1962).
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(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to merchants who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery or any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been
such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
The majority found that Moon had entrusted the truck to Hollowell and
that Simson therefore had good title.
Dissenting, Chief Judge Bell and Judge Evans pointed out that Hollowell did not have possession of the truck, so there was no "entrusting." More
importantly, these dissents recognized that Moon was the only person who
could have had a certificate of title issued under the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act,9 which protects purchasers of motor vehicles in Georgia
by requiring the issuance of a certificate of title. The majority failed to
recognize the importance of requiring all motor vehicles to be titled and
all transfers to be made only by a transfer of the certificate of title. By
finding that Simson had superior title to Moon, the majority has placed
those who purchase a motor vehicle from a dealer in a position of jeopardy.
B.

Warranties

The court of appeals decided two cases about the limits of the warranty
provisions of Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code. In Parzini v.
Central Chemical Co.,"0 the court found that the express and implied warranties of the sales article of the UCC do not extend to an employee of a
purchaser, because no privity exists between the manufacturer and the
employee. A similar result was reached in Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel,
Inc.," in which the employee purchased gasoline for the account of his
employer. The court found that the true purchaser was the employer, since
the employee was merely an agent of the employer and his principal was
disclosed. In Parzini, after holding that the Article II warranties were not
available to the employee, the court went on to discuss the affects of
Georgia Code §105-106, which provides in part:
[T]he manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either
directly or through a dealer or any other person, shall be liable in tort,
irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume or
reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person
or his property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was
not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended and its condi9. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 68-4A (1975).
10. 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d 700 (1975).
11. 135 Ga. App. 536, 218 S.E.2d 260 (1975).
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tion when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained; a manufacturer may not exclude or limit the operation thereof.
The court recognized that this language had adopted the warranties of
merchantability and suitability for an intended use of §2-314 and §2-315
of the UCC.11 The court discussed the question whether negligence must
be shown to recover under the provisions of §105-106, since the action was
in tort, and determined that it did not. The 1968 amendment to that code
section imposes upon the manufacturers of new personal property "strict
liability" for injuries to persons and property regardless of privity. The
result is a hybrid statute that grants an injured party a cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty without requiring privity and imposes strict
liability upon a manufacturer without a showing of the manufacturer's
negligence.
Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp.,"3 considered the question whether
the implied warranty provisions of the UCC applied to a transaction that
is denoted as a lease. Redfern entered a "truck lease service agreement"
with Hertz for the rental of several tractors and refrigerated trailers. One
of the refrigerating units on a trailer failed, and $7,574.74 worth of meat
spoiled. Redfern brought suit against Hertz in two counts, alleging that
Hertz had breached its implied warranty of merchantability and implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and that Hertz had breached
its bailor warranty under Georgia Code §12-204. Hertz responded by pointing out a paragraph in the lease entitled "Non-liability for Contest," which
provided: "Hertz shall not be liable for loss of or damage to any property
left, stored, loaded or transported in or upori any vehicle furnished by
Hertz to Customer pursuant to this Agreement, whether or not due to the
negligence of Hertz, its agents or employees, and the Customer hereby
agrees to hold Hertz, its agents and employees, harmless from and to
defend and indemnify them from and against all claims based upon or
arising out of such loss or damage." Code §12-204 provides: "The obligations of the bailor of things are . . . to warrant the right of possession, and
that the thing bailed is free from any secret fault rendering it unfitted for
the purposes for which it is hired."
The "non-liability for contest" paragraph of the leasing agreement was
not in bold type or set apart from the rest of the body of the contract in
any way. Redfern claimed that the disclaimer was ineffective, since Georgia Code §109A-2-316(2) requires an exclusion of the warranty of merchantability or the warranty of fitness to be in writing and be conspicuous.
Hertz contended that Georgia Code §109A-2-316 did not apply to a Code
§12-204 warranty. The court agreed with Hertz. Therefore, the exculpatory
12.

GA. CODE ANN. §109A-2-314 (1973) (implied warranty of merchantability); GA. CODE

ANN. §109A-2-315 (1973) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).

13.

134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975).

COMMERCIAL LAW

19761

clause contained in the leasing agreement effectively disclaimed the §12204 warranty.
The court then considered the question whether the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose applied. The court
first held that implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code apply
only to contracts for sale and do not apply to "true" leases. The court did,
however, extend the UCC provision to include transactions that are analogous to a sale. In Redfern, the agreement was called a lease and the weekly
rent greatly exceeded the weekly credit for depreciation allowed Redfern
toward the purchase price; but Redfern was required to purchase the
equipment if the lease were terminated before the end of the eighth year
of the lease. On that basis, the court found the agreement to be analogous
to a sale and the implied warranties of the UCC to be applicable.
In Southern Protective Products Co. v. Leasing International,Inc.," the
court faced a similar problem. Leasing International had leased two trucks
to Southern Protective. The drive shaft "flew off" one of the trucks and
damaged nearby vehicles owned by Southern Protective. Southern Protective sued Leasing International for the cost of repairing its vehicles, the
cost of renting a replacement for the defective truck and the cost of repairing the defective truck, which was not covered by the manufacturer's warranty. Leasing International defended on the basis of a hold-harmless provision in the lease agreement. The court found that the bailor warranties
of § 12-204 had been disclaimed by the language in the master lease agreement. In this case, the lessee did not have available the warranty provisions of the UCC, since it was not obligated to purchase the equipment.
C.

Breach, Excuse and Remedy

Wallace v. Aetna Finance Co. 5 was a case about an affidavit to foreclose
a security interest in personal property. The debtor failed to answer or
appear at the hearing, and Aetna made application for a default judgment
for the balance due "as provided by Code, Title 67-704." The court of
appeals held:
Code §67-704 provides: "If the defendant fails to answer, the court shall
grant a writ of possession and, if otherwise permitted by this Chapter,the
plaintiff shall be entitled to a verdict and a judgment by default for all of
the amount due, together with costs, in open court or chambers, as if every
item and paragraph of the affidavit provided for in Section 67-702 was
supported by proper evidence without the intervention of a jury." (Emphasis supplied.) This section allows a money judgment by default only
"if otherwise permitted by this Chapter"; and since there is no provision
elsewhere in the Chapter which would permit such a judgment, it may not
be entered."
14.
15.
16.

134 Ga. App. 945, 216 S.E.2d 725 (1975).
137 Ga. App. 580, 224 S.E.2d 517 (1976).
Id. at 581, 224 S.E.2d at 518.
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Lewis v. First National Bank of Miami 7 dealt with a motor vehicle
purchased in Florida by a Georgia resident and financed by a Florida
creditor. Subsequently, the motor vehicle was moved to Georgia, where it
was repossessed by an agent of the creditor, a Georgia corporation, and
resold. The creditor sued for a deficiency judgment. The sole issue presented was whether the rights of the creditor to a deficiency judgment were
determined by the laws of Florida or by the laws of Georgia. The court held
that without an agreement that the law of another state shall govern, the
law of Georgia applies to repossession, resale and the right to a deficiency
judgment if the collateral was located in Georgia at the time of the
repossession and resale.
In another case dealing with a deficiency on a financed automobile, the
court of appeals held that a novation is avoided where a creditor accepts
late payments when the contract specifically provides:
It is agreed that the waiver or indulgence of any default or the failure to
exercise any right hereunder shall not be construed as an agreement to
modify the terms of this agreement or to operate as a waiver of any subsequent default. It is further agreed that this instrument contains the entire
agreement of the parties and may be modified or altered only in writing."
The debtor was 30 days late in his payments twice, four months behind
twice, and five months behind once. There was no notice to him that strict
compliance with the original terms of the contract would be insisted upon.
The debtor contended that Georgia Code §109A-2-209(2) made the contract provision inoperative, since it was not separately set out and separately executed by the parties. The court found that this provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code applies only to merchants, and the creditor was
not a merchant.
In a dissent, Judge Evans pointed to Code §20-116, which provides that
when parties depart from the terms of the original contract and pay or
receive money and the creditor later intends to insist upon payments on
time as provided in the original contract, reasonable notice must be given
to the debtor. Judge Evans felt that the contract provisions prohibiting a
novation were contrary to public policyas expressed in §20-116 and therefore were void.
Georgia Code §53-503 was amended in 1969's to allow a married woman
to bind her personal estate, composed of real property and intangible personal property, by a contract of suretyship guaranteeing the payment of
the debts of her husband. In Citizens and Southern National Bank v.
Mann,10 Katherine E. Mann unconditionally guaranteed the full and
17. 134 Ga. App. 798, 216 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
18. Trust Co. of Georgia v. Montgomery, 136 Ga. App. 742, 743, 222 S.E.2d 196, 197
(1975).
19. Ga. Laws, 1969, pp. 72-73.
20. 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

19761

COMMERCIAL LAW

prompt payment to the bank of all obligations of a Georgia corporation
owned by her husband. The corporation defaulted, and the Citizens &
Southern National Bank filed a complaint against Mrs. Mann. She defended the action on numerous grounds claiming that the 1969 amendment
to §53-503 was unconstitutional. The supreme court rejected all of these
arguments and found that the 1969 amendment conformed to all the provisions of both the state and federal Constitutions.
III.

COMMERCIAL PAPER

Georgia Code §103-205 provides that a surety, guarantor or endorser, at
any time after the debt on which he is liable becomes due, may give written
notice to the creditor to proceed to collect the same from the principal; if
the creditor refuses or fails to begin an action for three months after such
notice, the endorser, guarantor, or surety giving the notice, as well as all
subsequent endorsers are discharged. The following is the complete decision in Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Price:2
This is an action against the guarantor of a promissory note. Pursuant to
Code Section 103-205, the guarantor had notified the creditor in writing
to proceed to collect the debt from the principals, setting forth their
county of residence. The creditor failed to commence an action against
them within three months after the notification, resulting in discharge of
the guarantor. Code Section 103-205. Accordingly the lower court did not
err in granting his motion for summary judgment.
An editorial note after §103-205 refers readers to a note under §103-201 "for
the effect of the U.C.C. upon the subject matter of this section." That
second editorial note states:
This and the following sections insofar as they relate to the discharge of
persons secondarily liable on negotiable instruments were superseded by
former §14-902, which made provision for the discharge of the persons
secondarily liable on negotiable instruments. The matter of such discharge is presently governed by the U.C.C. See §§109A-3-601(3), 109A-3604(2), 109A-3-605, 109A-3-606.
It appeared that §103-205 had been repealed by the Negotiable Instrument
Law and that this area would be controlled by the Uniform Commercial
Code provisions on commercial paper. This obviously does not conform to
the views of the court of appeals.
Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Plott" is another example of the
dangers of computers. The plaintiff, Plott, took a judgment against
"Julian R. Jordan, 1554 Piedmont Road, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia" in the
21.
22.

136 Ga. App. 302, 303, 221 S.E.2d 71 (1975).
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amount of $30,000 plus interest and court costs. He later filed an affidavit
of garnishment and had a summons served upon the Citizens & Southern
National Bank. All of the bank's individual accounts were stored on electronic data-processing equipment. The bank made a search of these accounts for the name of "Julian R. Jordan" and then for the first-name
initials "J" and "R" but no such account came to light. Going further, the
bank searched its business records, which were not computerized. There
it found an account in the name of "Jordan Jewelers," with "J. R. Jordan"
listed as "self-owner." The signature card for the account contained nothing to indicate what the initial "R" stood for. Nor did it indicate any other
account that may have been listed in a different name. The bank did, in
fact, have an individual account in the name of "Mr. Bob Jordan." The
court held:
The fact that the garnishee bank's retrieval system for its account files
failed to disclose to its officer in charge of answering garnishments the
contents of the "Mr. Bob Jordan" file does not relieve the bank of its
responsibility. Whether or not its retrieval system functions, it is on notice
of the contents of its account files.Y"
The bank was obligated to pay the plaintiff the amount that went through
the accounts of Mr. Bob Jordan during the time the garnishment was in
effect.
IV.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

As usual, there have been a number of interesting cases decided in the
area of secured transactions over the period covered by this survey. In
Leiden v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,24 the court of appeals held
that an attorney's lien under Georgia Code §9-613 for services to his client
in collecting insurance proceeds under an automobile-casualty policy is
subordinate to the rights of a lender who holds a security interest in the
automobile and to whom a loss is payable under a mortgagee clause attached to the policy. The court pointed out that the debtor's attorney could
gain no greater position than that held by his client. Since the debtor's
interest under the casualty policy was subordinate to that of the lienholder, the attorney's lien was subordinate, too.
EnterprisesNow, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Development Corp.2 5 presents an interesting question of priorities. A debtor with a long history of
financial dealings with C&S Bank granted C&S a security interest in all
of its inventory and equipment. When C&S learned that the debtor was
planning to open a new store, it feared that the store would be stocked with
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 778, 218 S.E.2d at 902.
136 Ga. App. 268, 220 S.E.2d 716 (1975).
135 Ga. App. 602, 218 S.E.2d 309 (1975).
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inventory in which it had a security interest. So C&S obtained from the
debtor a financing statement covering inventory and equipment in the new
store. The financing statement was filed on June 5, 1972; the security
interest that the statement was meant to cover was not perfected until
March 5, 1973, when the debtor executed a security agreement to C&S and
C&S advanced funds to the debtor.
Enterprises Now agreed to loan the debtor some money and to take a
security interest in the same collateral covered by C&S's financing statement. The loan was negotiated on or about June 1, 1972, but was not
perfected until June 27, 1972, when Enterprises Now filed its financing
statement for record. The court reviewed the history of the loans and
determined that both creditors had perfected security interests. The court
then looked to Georgia Code §109A-9-312(5)(a) to determine which party
had priority. That section states that when a security interest is perfected
by filing, the order of filing determines priority. The court found that
C&S's interest had priority, since its financing statement was filed for
record before that of Enterprises Now, even though its security interest was
perfected nine months later. The court said, "[Tihe official comments of
the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the justification for the rule
lies in the necessity of protecting the filing system-That is, of allowing
the secured party who has first filed to make subsequent advances without
each time having, as a condition of protection, to check for filings later
than his.""6
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Miline" dealt with the question of notice of
default before repossession. Milline purchased a new 1971 Mercury, which
he financed through Ford Motor Credit Company. In February 1972, the
car was in a collision and Milline took the car to the dealer for repairs.
While the car was being repaired, Milline rented a Comet sedan from the
dealer. He became indebted for this rental car and for damages to the
Comet while it was in his possession. After the repairs had been completed,
Ford Credit repossessed the Mercury by taking it from the dealer's shop.
In May 1972, Milline paid Ford Credit $1,235.24 to cover the delinquent
payments, the insurance deductible on the Mercury, and the rental of the
Comet plus the damages caused to the Comet. Through a clerical error by
Ford Credit, the entire payment was credited on the finance company's
books to the installment contract.
Several months later, the Mercury was in a second collision and Milline
again took it to the dealer. While the car was there for repairs, Ford Credit
discovered it had failed to obtain reinstatement of the plaintiff's physical
damage insurance, which had been canceled after the first repossession.
The mistake was admitted by Ford Credit, which voluntarily paid
$1,913.28 to the dealer for repairs arising out of the "second wreck." After
26.
27.

Id. at 604, 218 S.E.2d at 311.
137 Ga. App. 585, 224 S.E.2d 437 (1976).
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the repairs were completed, Ford Credit decided to repossess the vehicle
because of Milline's failure to make the payments. That was done on
October 31, 1972, without prior written or oral notice to Milline and without notifying Milline of the finance company's decision to declare the
entire balance due because of default. The automobile was removed from
the dealer's possession without judicial process.
On the date of repossession, Ford Credit mailed Milline a form letter
giving him notice of the repossession and the acceleration of the balance
due under the contract. This notice informed Milline of his rights under
the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act 2" and of Ford Credit's intention to
pursue a deficiency. Milline, through his attorney, immediately demanded
return of the automobile. Ford Credit refused to return the automobile
unless the contract was made current. Milline declined and filed suit
against the dealer and the finance company. A jury awarded Milline $4,500
for the value of the automobile, $3,650 for the hire, $4,415 as attorney fees,
and $10,000 as punitive damages for the wrongful conversion of the automobile by Ford Credit. Ford Credit appealed.
The court, in making its decision, relied upon C&S Motors, Inc. v.
Davidson," which dealt with a self-help repossession under an installmentsales contract containing the following provision:
If any installment of the debt hereby secured be not paid when due, or
should there be any breach or default by Buyer in any of the terms,
conditions, representations, warranties, or covenants contained herein, or
if any execution, attachment or other writ be levied on the property, or if
a petition under the Bankruptcy Act be filed -by or against any Buyer
hereon, or if any Buyer makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
or if the holder of this contract at any time deems itself insecure, then said
holder shall have the right, at its option, without demand or notice of any
kind, to declare this contract in default, and to declare the unpaid Total
of Payments immediately due and payable and to sue therefor; or to take
possession of the Vehicle wherever it may be found, including all parts and
equipment placed thereon, and thereafter sell the Vehicle all in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, or any other applicable laws of the State.
Interpreting this contractual provision, the court in Davidson held:
The acceleration clause gave defendant the right, "at its option" to "declare" the contract in default and to "declare" the unpaid balance immediately due and payable. This required affirmative action by the defendant of notifying plaintiff of its election to declare the contract in default
and to accelerate it to maturity. The peremptory taking of the automobile
without notice does not suffice. The language in the instrument that no
notice was required is meaningless and of no effect.2
28. GA. CODE ANN. §96-1001 et seq. (1976).
29. 133 Ga. App. 891, 212 S.E.2d 502 (1975).
30. Id. at 892, 212 S.E.2d at 503.
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In the Milline case, the court affirmed its ruling in Davidson. It held that
notice of both default and acceleration was required before a self-help
repossession of the automobile. The court recognized the creditor's right
to peaceably repossess the automobile, but it found that to do so without
prior notice to the debtor was a conversion. These cases are disturbing,
because the court equates default and acceleration. In Milline, the court
stated it this way:
However, the contract at bar also contains additional language which was
passed upon by this court in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes and C & S
Motors, Inc. v. Davidson [citations omitted] ... [Tihis court concluded that the acceleration clause language "required affirmative action
by defendant of notifying plaintiff of its election to declare the contract
in default and to accelerate it to maturity. The peremptory taking of the
automobile without notice does not suffice."'
Default and acceleration should be recognized as two separate occurrences.
Default is a failure upon the part of one party to the contract to discharge
his obligations; acceleration is a contractual remedy of the creditor to be
used when a borrower defaults. A creditor may declare a default with or
without accelerating the remaining payments. Georgia Code §109A-9-503
provides: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral." This section does not require notice
to the debtor upon default, nor does it require acceleration prior to repossession. Acceleration is usually an optional remedy of the creditor and
therefore is one that may require notice. Default generally is an automatic
event that results from not complying with the contract provisions. While
the language of the contract supports the court's ruling, the holding in
these cases is antithetical to normal commercial practice. These cases
should be limited to their facts. Indeed, another division of the court of
appeals has reached a decision opposite the decisions in Milline and Davidson. Horn v. Fulton National Bank32 held that a creditor's right to repossess
is absolute once a default has occurred, and the secured party is not required to give notice of its intention to retake the property.
VI.

INDUSTRIAL LOAN ACT AND TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT

The court of appeals in Hodges v. Community Loan and Investment
Corp.13 held that even though a loan contract was null and void under the
Industrial Loan Act" because of usury, the lender could recover from the
borrowers the principal due on the loan, as money had and received, and
interest at 7%. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. 5 The court con31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

137 Ga. App. at 588-89, 224 S.E.2d at 440.
No. 52605 (Ga. App., Sept. 22, 1976).
133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §25-301 et seq. (1976).
Hodges v. Community Loan and Inv. Corp., 234 Ga. 247, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975).
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cluded that the unambiguous language of Georgia Code §25-9903 required
a holding that a contract made in violation of the Industrial Loan Act is
null and void and that there can be no recovery of the principal in a suit
for money had and received. Subsequently, the court of appeals decided a
peripheral issue in Household Finance Corp. of Atlanta v. Raven." Household Finance had made a loan that the borrower claimed was usurious
under the Industrial Loan Act. The lender denied that the contract was
void and sued to collect the balance due. The defendant filed a counterclaim for $100 as damages authorized by Code §109A-9-404.7 The court
found that the contract was indeed usurious and that the debtor therefore
was entitled to the $100 penalty. The court said the penalty was due
because the loan was void from its inception under Code §25-9903.
Last year's survey discussed a number of cases dealing with acceleration
clauses that were decided under the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. Since
then two more significant cases have been decided on the acceleration
clause issue. The first was Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc. ,3 an en-banc
decision of the court of appeals considering an acceleration clause in a
retail installment contract made under the Georgia Retail Installment and
Home Solicitation Act. 39 Judge Clark, in a well-reasoned opinion, reviewed
all of the acceleration clause cases. He said the cases decided under the
Georgia Industrial Loan Act held that a lender violated the usury provisions of that Act by including in its contract an acceleration clause that
did not affirmatively provide for a rebate of all unearned interest upon
acceleration when the creditor had contracted for the right to collect the
unearned interest in the event of default. Judge Clark stated that these
decisions were based on the peculiar language of the Georgia Industrial
Loan Act, which provides that a creditor may not "contract for" usurious
interest.' 0 He then stated the general rule that any contract provision
should be interpreted to conform to law if at all possible. The acceleration
clause in the Loosier contract provided for acceleration of "the entire
amount of the purchaser's indebtedness." Speaking for the court, Judge
Clark held: "Accordingly, the proper construction of this language is to
read therein the statutory rates."" Even though the language of the acceleration clause did not specifically provide for a rebate of all unearned
interest, the majority held that such a requirement must be read into the
acceleration clause to make it meet the requirements of the statute. A
strong dissent was issued by Judge Quillian, who was joined in by Judge
36. 136 Ga. App. 424, 221 S.E.2d 488 (1975).
37. GA. CODE ANN. §109A-9-404 (1973) provides for a penalty of $100 if, within ten days
after a proper demand for a termination statement, the secured party fails to send the
statement.
38. 137 Ga. App. 50, 222 S.E.2d 839 (1975).
39. GA. CODE ANN. §96-901 et seq. (1976).
40. GA. CODE ANN. §25-315 (1976).
41. 137 Ga. App. at 54, 222 S.E.2d at 842.
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Stolz and Judge Evans.
A similar result was reached in Price v. Guardian Mortgage Corp.,4"
which was decided under Georgia Code chapter 57-2 dealing with secondary security deeds. The acceleration clause in the case provided that "the
entire unpaid principal sum evidenced by this note and interest shall be
due upon default." The court held:
The construction which will uphold a contract in whole and in every part
is to be preferred. Code §20-704(4). "An intention contrary to the law
should not be read into a contract by placing such a construction upon a
provision therein, when the provision is just as susceptible of a construction that will show a lawful intention on the part of the parties." Southern
Loan Company v. McDaniel, 50 Ga. App. 285, 286 (177 S.E. 834). We
accordingly hold that the term "interest" as used in acceleration clauses
so that the 6% note is not usurious
means earned and accrued interest
3
under Code Ann. §57-202(d).1
Taken together, Bell and Price go a long way toward clearing up the
uncertainties created by the Industrial Loan Act cases beginning with
Lewis v. Termplan, Inc., Bolton." The effect of these decisions was to
limit the holdings of Georgia Industrial Loan Act cases to contracts made
under that particular statute. Presumably, the reasoning of Bell and Price
extends to the general usury statutes and to the Georgia Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act. The supreme court has affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals in Bell.4"
Two cases of particular interest have been decided under the Truth-inLending Act. In John H. Paer v. Aetna Finance Co.,4" the U. S. District
Court held that a post-maturity rate in excess of 7% simple interest in a
sales contract is a "default, delinquency, or similar charge payable in the
event of late payments" within the meaning of §226.8(b)(4) of Regulation
Z.1' In Jones v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.,'4 the Fifth Circuit
held that a loan fee charged a debtor under the Georgia Industrial Loan
Act must be disclosed as a prepaid finance charge under §§226.8(d) and
(e)(1) of Regulation Z.4 A motion for rehearing has been filed, and the
Federal Reserve Board has submitted a brief in opposition to this ruling.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
GUIDE

49.

137 Ga. App. 519, 224 S.E.2d 451 (1976).
Id. at 521, 224 S.E.2d at 453.
124 Ga. App. 507, 184 S.E.2d 473 (1971).
Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc., No. 30868 (Ga., Sept. 8, 1976).
No. C74-1144A (N.D. Ga., May 1976).
12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(4) (1976).
Nos. 74-3586, 74-3975, 74-4183 (5th Cir., Jan. 20, 1976), 5 CCH
98,485.
12 C.F.R. §§226.8(d), 226.8(e)(1).
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CONCLUSON

The heavy volume of case law in the commercial area is continuing
unabated. It seems that both the attorneys handling these cases and the
courts deciding them are gaining a greater degree of sophistication. If this
trend continues, those of us handling commercial transactions will have a
stable base of both statutory and case law from which to work.

